by William M. Brennan, TH.D.
Introduction
The dialectic between divine sovereignty and human responsibility has long been a focal point of Christian theological reflection. Much of the tension, however, is generated by importing philosophical constructs—most notably libertarian free will—into the biblical framework. Libertarian freedom defines human agency as the power to make morally significant choices from a position of neutrality, unconditioned by any prior disposition or inclination of the will. This model presupposes an anthropological and metaphysical structure foreign to Scripture. When one rejects the libertarian premise and replaces it with biblical categories—natural ability, moral inability, bondage of the will, common grace, and sovereign providence—the apparent contradiction dissolves. The present essay argues that divine sovereignty and genuine human responsibility coexist coherently once we adopt the biblical presupposition that God does not coerce internal moral choices, even though He sovereignly ordains the circumstances in which they are made.
I. The Impossibility of Libertarian Free Will
1. The Scriptural Denial of Moral Neutrality
Libertarian free will requires the functional equivalent of a moral vacuum in which the human agent possesses a posture of equilibrium toward good and evil. Such a condition is nowhere attested in Scripture. Quite the contrary, Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 12:33 establishes a determinative relationship between nature and action: “Make a tree good and its fruit will be good, or make a tree bad and its fruit will be bad.”¹ The tree’s fruit is not morally neutral but expressive of its internal constitution. Actions reveal nature, not indeterminate freedom. Thus, moral decisions arise from preexisting dispositions.
2. Divine Impossibility and the Limits of Will
Libertarian freedom is not only absent in humanity; it is impossible even for God. Scripture is unambiguous that there are divine impossibilities: God “cannot lie” (Titus 1:2), deny Himself (2 Tim 2:13), or change His eternal decree (Num 23:19). These “cannot” statements do not indicate weakness but rather perfection of nature. God’s will is bound—not externally, but internally—by His immutable holiness.² To claim that God must possess libertarian freedom would require that God be capable of sin or contradiction, which is metaphysically incoherent.
Thus, if libertarian freedom is impossible for a maximally perfect being, it cannot coherently be demanded of finite creatures.
II. Natural Ability and Moral Ability: A Necessary Distinction
A proper understanding of human agency requires distinguishing natural ability from moral ability.
1. Natural Ability
Natural ability refers to the possession of intact rational, volitional, and emotional faculties adequate for moral deliberation.³ Scripture affirms that human beings, even in their fallen state, have minds capable of reasoning, choosing, deliberating, and understanding moral norms (Rom 2:14–15). God does not force thought processes or bypass these faculties; He addresses them through revelation, law, conscience, and providence.
2. Moral Inability
Moral inability refers to the disposition of the heart—what Jonathan Edwards called “the inability of inclination.”⁴ A sinner is morally unable to choose the good because he does not desire it. This inability is not a lack of capacity but a corruption of inclination. As Augustine famously stated, human beings are non posse non peccare in their unregenerate state. Luther sharpened this insight in De Servo Arbitrio (The Bondage of the Will), arguing that the will is “free” only in the sense that it always follows its strongest desire, but the unregenerate heart desires evil.⁵
Thus, human beings possess natural ability but lack moral ability. Responsibility attaches to natural ability and voluntariness, not to libertarian neutrality.
III. Divine Sovereignty Over Circumstances Without Internal Coercion
1. The Scope of Divine Providence
Scripture asserts that God “works all things after the counsel of His will” (Eph 1:11). This includes the arrangement of the external circumstances in which human beings make moral decisions. Providence encompasses historical events, interpersonal relations, timing, opportunities, and constraints.⁶ Nothing exists outside the sphere of divine decree.
2. The Non-Causation of Sinful Motives
Despite God’s sovereignty over circumstances, Scripture explicitly excludes God from being the author or cause of internal sinful motives: “God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does He tempt anyone” (Jas 1:13). The willing of sin arises entirely from the corrupted heart of man. God arranges contexts, but the heart supplies the content of sinful choice.
This model preserves:
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Divine sovereignty over all conditions
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Human voluntariness in all moral acts
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Divine holiness, because God never implants sin internally
The sinner’s choice is thus conditioned by divine providence but determined by his own corrupt nature.
IV. The Restrictive and Enabling Function of Common Grace
Common grace functions as a mitigating factor within fallen humanity. It restrains the full expression of depravity and enables relatively virtuous actions without producing spiritual righteousness. Calvin described common grace as God’s merciful restraint upon human nature and human society.⁷ Through conscience (Rom 2:15), civic virtue, social order, and intellectual illumination, God limits evil and allows human beings to seek proximate goods.
Common grace does not, however, liberate the will from its bondage; it merely prevents evil from reaching its maximal expression. It ensures that human choices are varied and complex without being morally neutral.
V. Voluntariness as the Basis of Moral Responsibility
The moral accountability of human beings rests not on libertarian freedom but on voluntariness. A morally responsible act must:
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Arise from the agent’s own will
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Proceed without external coercion
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Be performed with natural faculties intact
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Reflect the person’s character
These conditions are satisfied in every human action. The sinner’s decision to sin is always voluntary—indeed, irresistibly so, because it flows from what the sinner most desires.⁸ Divine sovereignty never forces sin; it merely provides the stage on which freely acting sinners perform according to their natures.
This framework aligns with the biblical narratives of Pharaoh (Exod 4–14), Judas (John 13:27), and the Assyrian empire (Isa 10:5–15): God ordained the historical circumstances, but each actor’s sin arose voluntarily from his own heart.
Conclusion
When libertarian free will is removed from the discussion, the reconciliation of divine sovereignty and human responsibility becomes theologically straightforward. The biblical model affirms:
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Absolute divine sovereignty over all events and circumstances
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Genuine human responsibility grounded in natural ability and voluntariness
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Bondage of the will rooted in moral corruption
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Divine non-coercion regarding internal sinful motives
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Common grace as a restraining and enabling factor
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A coherent causal structure in which God ordains the context while humans determine the moral content of their choices
This concludes that the supposed contradiction between sovereignty and responsibility arises only when libertarian assumptions are inserted into the biblical text. Scripture resolves the tension by maintaining a compatibilist model in which God governs all things and humans act freely according to their natures. The result is a theologically robust, philosophically coherent account of human agency under divine sovereignty—one that safeguards both divine holiness and human accountability.
Footnotes
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Matt 12:33 underscores the causal priority of moral nature over moral action, contradicting any notion of moral neutrality.
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See classical discussions in Augustine, De Trinitate, and Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, on divine immutability and moral necessity.
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For modern discussion, see John Frame, The Doctrine of the Christian Life (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2008), 113–120.
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Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will (1754), argues that the will always follows the strongest inclination; moral inability is thus an inability of desire, not of natural faculty.
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Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (1525), esp. sections on voluntas and servitus.
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Classic treatments of providence include Calvin, Institutes, I.16–18.
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Calvin, Institutes, II.2.13–17.
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Augustine, Confessions, VII.16, articulates voluntariness as the locus of moral responsibility despite the corruption of the will.
