Monday, December 22, 2025

Eternal Privation and the Eclipse of Divine Love: A Theological Critique of the Augustinian Doctrine of Hell

 By Rev.William M. Brennan, TH.D.


Abstract

This essay argues that Augustine’s doctrine of evil as privatio boni, when combined with his commitment to eternal conscious punishment, generates a series of metaphysical, moral, and biblical incoherences. Although Augustine successfully rejects Manichaean ontological dualism, he preserves a functional and eschatological dualism in which evil—understood as unhealed privation—endures eternally alongside the good. This results in a theological vision that subordinates divine love to retributive justice and cosmic order, in tension with the biblical portrayal of God as Father revealed by Jesus Christ. By examining Augustine’s account of justice, freedom, fatherhood, punishment, and infinity (including its later Anselmian development), this essay contends that eternal non-restorative punishment neither satisfies justice nor coheres with Scripture’s moral and eschatological grammar. The Augustinian model thus proves theologically defective, not merely pastorally troubling.


1. Introduction: Augustine’s Achievement and Its Cost

Augustine’s rejection of Manichaeism stands as one of the most important theological achievements in Christian intellectual history. By defining evil not as a substance or rival principle but as a privation of good, Augustine safeguarded the doctrine of creation’s goodness and God’s sole ultimacy. Yet this metaphysical victory came at a cost. When paired with Augustine’s doctrine of eternal conscious punishment, the privation account of evil no longer functions as a solution to the problem of evil, but instead becomes a constraint within which evil is preserved indefinitely.

The central contention of this essay is that Augustine’s theology ultimately renders evil eschatologically ultimate, if not ontologically so. Evil does not endure as a competing substance, but as an everlasting absence—an unhealed privation sustained by divine will. This result compromises Augustine’s own metaphysical principles, undermines the biblical presentation of divine love, and empties the concept of justice of its restorative telos.


2. Eternal Privation and Functional Dualism

Augustine denies that evil has positive being. Yet in affirming eternal hell, he affirms the everlasting existence of rational creatures whose wills remain permanently disordered. The privation—lack of rightly ordered love, peace, and communion with God—is never healed. As a result, evil persists without end, not as substance but as condition.

This introduces what may be called a contained or functional dualism. While Augustine avoids Manichaean metaphysics, he nevertheless posits two final and permanent states of reality: perfect blessedness and perfect misery. Evil is not co-eternal in origin, but it is co-eternal in outcome. The cosmos is forever structured by an unresolved lack.

Thus, Augustine’s privation theory no longer eliminates evil’s permanence; it merely redescribes it. Evil is not defeated but stabilized. It loses its independence, but not its duration.


3. Justice, Order, and the Failure of Necessity

Augustine’s primary justification for eternal punishment appeals to justice and cosmic order. Yet a crucial distinction must be made: justice may permit non-restoration, but it does not require it.

If justice is fundamentally the right ordering of relationships, then restoration—rather than endless exclusion—more fully satisfies its aims. A universe in which every will is healed, every disorder corrected, and every privation filled would exhibit greater order, not less. Eternal non-restoration preserves a permanent disorder within creation, contradicting Augustine’s own definition of peace as tranquillitas ordinis.

Once it is conceded that justice does not demand refusal to regenerate, the order argument collapses. Eternal punishment can no longer be justified as necessary; it becomes a contingent divine choice. At that point, love—not justice—must explain why restoration does not occur. And Augustine does not allow love to bear that explanatory weight.


4. Divine Fatherhood and the A Fortiori Argument of Jesus

The most serious biblical objection to Augustine’s position arises from Jesus’ teaching on divine fatherhood, particularly in the Sermon on the Mount. Jesus explicitly authorizes a moral inference from human parenting to God: if flawed parents give good gifts to their children, how much more will the heavenly Father do so.

This argument establishes not merely a promise, but a revelation of divine character. God is not less compassionate than the best human father; he is more so. A father who could rescue a wayward child from endless ruin at no cost but refuses would be morally reprehensible by human standards—standards Jesus explicitly elevates rather than suspends.

Attempts to restrict divine fatherhood to the elect fail to resolve the tension. Scripture identifies Adam as God’s son, implying a creational fatherhood that extends to all humanity. Even if covenantal distinctions are granted, they cannot negate the moral logic of Jesus’ a fortiori reasoning. A God who eternally abandons his redeemable offspring violates the very moral pattern he commands human parents to embody.


5. Biblical Patterns of Restorative Judgment

Scripture consistently presents judgment as measured, purposeful, and oriented toward restoration. The language of punishment being “paid in full,” exemplified in Israel’s having received a “double portion” for her sins, signifies completion rather than perpetuity. Punishment has a terminus; justice is satisfied; restoration follows.

This biblical logic exposes a fatal flaw in the doctrine of endless punishment: an endless penalty can never be paid in full. What is never completed can never satisfy justice. Punishment without completion lacks telos and therefore ceases to be punishment in the biblical sense, devolving instead into perpetual ruin.


6. The Collapse of the Infinite Penalty Argument

The Anselmian claim that sin against infinite majesty requires infinite punishment depends on a quantitative notion of infinity. Once that notion is rejected, the argument fails. A qualitative understanding of infinity—as perfection or completeness—does not entail endless duration. On the contrary, perfect punishment would be punishment that fully achieves its purpose and therefore ends.

Endlessness signifies failure, not perfection. A punishment that never concludes never accomplishes justice. Thus, the infinite-penalty argument collapses under both philosophical scrutiny and biblical theology.


7. Christ’s Sufficiency and the Unnecessary Remainder

If Christ’s atoning work is sufficient for all, then no additional cost is required for universal regeneration. Eternal non-restoration therefore cannot be justified by scarcity, inability, or insufficiency. It represents not a tragic limit but a deliberate refusal.

At this point, Augustine’s system preserves an eternal remainder of unhealed evil not because it must, but because love is not permitted to complete its work. Justice is allowed to terminate in exclusion rather than reconciliation. Love is affirmed, but not allowed to be final.


8. Conclusion: Love or Order as Ultimate

Augustine’s theology presents a God who is just, sovereign, and orderly—but not one in whom love has the final word. Evil is denied substance, but granted permanence. Justice is satisfied, but never completed. Order is preserved, but at the cost of reconciliation.

The biblical vision, by contrast, portrays a God whose justice serves restoration, whose judgments heal, whose fatherhood exceeds the best human analogues, and whose final victory leaves no pocket of unredeemed ruin. A theology that eternally preserves privation—even under the name of justice—fails to reflect that vision.

Eternal punishment, therefore, is not the triumph of divine justice. It is the eclipse of divine love.

Monday, December 1, 2025

A Resolution to the Seeming Paradox between Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility

 by William M. Brennan, TH.D.

Introduction

The dialectic between divine sovereignty and human responsibility has long been a focal point of Christian theological reflection. Much of the tension, however, is generated by importing philosophical constructs—most notably libertarian free will—into the biblical framework. Libertarian freedom defines human agency as the power to make morally significant choices from a position of neutrality, unconditioned by any prior disposition or inclination of the will. This model presupposes an anthropological and metaphysical structure foreign to Scripture. When one rejects the libertarian premise and replaces it with biblical categories—natural ability, moral inability, bondage of the will, common grace, and sovereign providence—the apparent contradiction dissolves. The present essay argues that divine sovereignty and genuine human responsibility coexist coherently once we adopt the biblical presupposition that God does not coerce internal moral choices, even though He sovereignly ordains the circumstances in which they are made.


I. The Impossibility of Libertarian Free Will

1. The Scriptural Denial of Moral Neutrality

Libertarian free will requires the functional equivalent of a moral vacuum in which the human agent possesses a posture of equilibrium toward good and evil. Such a condition is nowhere attested in Scripture. Quite the contrary, Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 12:33 establishes a determinative relationship between nature and action: “Make a tree good and its fruit will be good, or make a tree bad and its fruit will be bad.”¹ The tree’s fruit is not morally neutral but expressive of its internal constitution. Actions reveal nature, not indeterminate freedom. Thus, moral decisions arise from preexisting dispositions.

2. Divine Impossibility and the Limits of Will

Libertarian freedom is not only absent in humanity; it is impossible even for God. Scripture is unambiguous that there are divine impossibilities: God “cannot lie” (Titus 1:2), deny Himself (2 Tim 2:13), or change His eternal decree (Num 23:19). These “cannot” statements do not indicate weakness but rather perfection of nature. God’s will is bound—not externally, but internally—by His immutable holiness.² To claim that God must possess libertarian freedom would require that God be capable of sin or contradiction, which is metaphysically incoherent.

Thus, if libertarian freedom is impossible for a maximally perfect being, it cannot coherently be demanded of finite creatures.


II. Natural Ability and Moral Ability: A Necessary Distinction

A proper understanding of human agency requires distinguishing natural ability from moral ability.

1. Natural Ability

Natural ability refers to the possession of intact rational, volitional, and emotional faculties adequate for moral deliberation.³ Scripture affirms that human beings, even in their fallen state, have minds capable of reasoning, choosing, deliberating, and understanding moral norms (Rom 2:14–15). God does not force thought processes or bypass these faculties; He addresses them through revelation, law, conscience, and providence.

2. Moral Inability

Moral inability refers to the disposition of the heart—what Jonathan Edwards called “the inability of inclination.”⁴ A sinner is morally unable to choose the good because he does not desire it. This inability is not a lack of capacity but a corruption of inclination. As Augustine famously stated, human beings are non posse non peccare in their unregenerate state. Luther sharpened this insight in De Servo Arbitrio (The Bondage of the Will), arguing that the will is “free” only in the sense that it always follows its strongest desire, but the unregenerate heart desires evil.⁵

Thus, human beings possess natural ability but lack moral ability. Responsibility attaches to natural ability and voluntariness, not to libertarian neutrality.


III. Divine Sovereignty Over Circumstances Without Internal Coercion

1. The Scope of Divine Providence

Scripture asserts that God “works all things after the counsel of His will” (Eph 1:11). This includes the arrangement of the external circumstances in which human beings make moral decisions. Providence encompasses historical events, interpersonal relations, timing, opportunities, and constraints.⁶ Nothing exists outside the sphere of divine decree.

2. The Non-Causation of Sinful Motives

Despite God’s sovereignty over circumstances, Scripture explicitly excludes God from being the author or cause of internal sinful motives: “God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does He tempt anyone” (Jas 1:13). The willing of sin arises entirely from the corrupted heart of man. God arranges contexts, but the heart supplies the content of sinful choice.

This model preserves:

  • Divine sovereignty over all conditions

  • Human voluntariness in all moral acts

  • Divine holiness, because God never implants sin internally

The sinner’s choice is thus conditioned by divine providence but determined by his own corrupt nature.


IV. The Restrictive and Enabling Function of Common Grace

Common grace functions as a mitigating factor within fallen humanity. It restrains the full expression of depravity and enables relatively virtuous actions without producing spiritual righteousness. Calvin described common grace as God’s merciful restraint upon human nature and human society.⁷ Through conscience (Rom 2:15), civic virtue, social order, and intellectual illumination, God limits evil and allows human beings to seek proximate goods.

Common grace does not, however, liberate the will from its bondage; it merely prevents evil from reaching its maximal expression. It ensures that human choices are varied and complex without being morally neutral.


V. Voluntariness as the Basis of Moral Responsibility

The moral accountability of human beings rests not on libertarian freedom but on voluntariness. A morally responsible act must:

  1. Arise from the agent’s own will

  2. Proceed without external coercion

  3. Be performed with natural faculties intact

  4. Reflect the person’s character

These conditions are satisfied in every human action. The sinner’s decision to sin is always voluntary—indeed, irresistibly so, because it flows from what the sinner most desires.⁸ Divine sovereignty never forces sin; it merely provides the stage on which freely acting sinners perform according to their natures.

This framework aligns with the biblical narratives of Pharaoh (Exod 4–14), Judas (John 13:27), and the Assyrian empire (Isa 10:5–15): God ordained the historical circumstances, but each actor’s sin arose voluntarily from his own heart.


Conclusion

When libertarian free will is removed from the discussion, the reconciliation of divine sovereignty and human responsibility becomes theologically straightforward. The biblical model affirms:

  1. Absolute divine sovereignty over all events and circumstances

  2. Genuine human responsibility grounded in natural ability and voluntariness

  3. Bondage of the will rooted in moral corruption

  4. Divine non-coercion regarding internal sinful motives

  5. Common grace as a restraining and enabling factor

  6. A coherent causal structure in which God ordains the context while humans determine the moral content of their choices

This concludes that the supposed contradiction between sovereignty and responsibility arises only when libertarian assumptions are inserted into the biblical text. Scripture resolves the tension by maintaining a compatibilist model in which God governs all things and humans act freely according to their natures. The result is a theologically robust, philosophically coherent account of human agency under divine sovereignty—one that safeguards both divine holiness and human accountability.


Footnotes

  1. Matt 12:33 underscores the causal priority of moral nature over moral action, contradicting any notion of moral neutrality.

  2. See classical discussions in Augustine, De Trinitate, and Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, on divine immutability and moral necessity.

  3. For modern discussion, see John Frame, The Doctrine of the Christian Life (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2008), 113–120.

  4. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will (1754), argues that the will always follows the strongest inclination; moral inability is thus an inability of desire, not of natural faculty.

  5. Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (1525), esp. sections on voluntas and servitus.

  6. Classic treatments of providence include Calvin, Institutes, I.16–18.

  7. Calvin, Institutes, II.2.13–17.

  8. Augustine, Confessions, VII.16, articulates voluntariness as the locus of moral responsibility despite the corruption of the will.

Two Perspectives on Permanence

 by Rev. William M. Brennan, TH.D. Temporal “Endlessness,” Celestial Eternity, and the Intervention of Christ Much confusion in Christian ...