by Rev. William M. Brennan, TH.D.
Abstract
This essay argues that the Augustinian–Calvinist account of divine goodness and love is internally incoherent and theologically deficient when measured against its own metaphysical commitments and the Christological revelation of God in Scripture. By examining the doctrine of evil as privation, the moral implications of selective non-redemption, and the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, it is contended that the refusal of divine aid to redeemable creatures constitutes an exacerbation of privation incompatible with perfect goodness and self-giving love. The essay concludes that a non-restorative account of divine love fails both philosophically and Christologically.
1. Introduction
Within the Western Christian tradition, the theology of Augustine of Hippo and its later development in John Calvin has exercised enormous influence on doctrines of divine goodness, love, and salvation. Central to this tradition is the claim that God’s refusal to redeem all creatures is compatible with perfect goodness and love, grounded either in divine justice (Augustine) or divine sovereignty (Calvin).
This essay challenges that claim. It argues that once evil is understood as privation of the good, and once divine love is interpreted through the moral character of Jesus Christ, selective non-redemption becomes morally incoherent. The refusal to heal corruption when healing is possible does not merely permit evil; it perpetuates and exacerbates privation. Moreover, such a conception of divine love stands in sharp tension with the self-giving, restorative love revealed in Christ.
2. Evil as Privation and the Moral Implications of Non-Redemption
Augustine’s privation theory of evil (privatio boni) holds that evil is not a substance or positive reality but a lack of the good that ought to be present. Corruption, sin, and disorder are deficiencies in being rather than entities in their own right. This framework is intended to absolve God of responsibility for evil by denying evil any ontological status.
However, this metaphysical move carries significant moral implications. If evil is a lack, then the moral response to evil is not merely restraint or permission, but restoration. A privation, by definition, calls for the reintroduction of the good that is absent. Consequently, when a perfectly good and omnipotent being knowingly refuses to restore a privation that it can restore at no cost, such refusal cannot be morally neutral.
The Augustinian distinction between causing evil and permitting evil collapses once remediation is possible. Permission may be morally intelligible where intervention is impossible, costly, or unjust; but where none of these constraints apply, non-intervention becomes a deliberate continuation of lack. Thus, on Augustine’s own metaphysical terms, non-redemption entails the perpetuation of privation.
3. Justice, Desert, and the Misplacement of Moral Reasoning
Augustine seeks to justify selective grace by appealing to human desert: all have sinned, none deserve salvation, and therefore God is not unjust in withholding grace from some. Yet this line of reasoning conflates juridical justice with ontological healing.
Privation is not a legal penalty but a deficiency of being. To refuse to restore a being to its proper good because it “deserves” corruption is conceptually confused. Illness is not justified by guilt, nor is healing rendered unjust by its gratuity. Once evil is understood as lack rather than crime, the relevant moral category shifts from retribution to beneficence.
Appeals to desert thus fail to address the central problem: why a perfectly good being would knowingly leave creatures in a corrupted state when restoration is possible.
4. Calvin’s Sovereignty and the Eclipse of Moral Goodness
Calvin radicalises Augustine’s position by grounding divine goodness not in any intelligible moral structure but in the divine will itself. Whatever God wills is good by definition. While this move secures internal consistency, it does so at the cost of evacuating moral language of content.
If goodness simply means “what God does,” then God’s love is no longer recognisable as love in any meaningful sense. Moral praise becomes impossible, and the claim that “God is good” ceases to be informative. Moreover, Calvin’s account instrumentalises privation: the continued corruption of the non-elect serves the end of divine glory. Evil, though officially denied ontological status, is granted functional necessity.
This position intensifies rather than resolves the moral problem. Privation becomes not merely tolerated but purposively sustained.
5. Christological Revelation and the Moral Logic of Divine Love
Christian theology affirms that the moral character of God is decisively revealed in the person and life of Jesus Christ. Christ is not merely a messenger of divine love but its embodiment. Consequently, doctrines of divine goodness must be coherent with Christ’s moral posture.
Christ consistently portrays divine action as need-responsive rather than desert-based. His declaration that He came “not for the righteous, but to heal the sick” establishes corruption as the very ground of divine intervention. Throughout the Gospels, Christ associates with morally compromised individuals, heals without precondition, and treats refusal to restore when possible as morally indefensible.
The physician metaphor is especially instructive. A physician does not withhold treatment because illness is self-inflicted or undeserved. Healing is not an act of discretionary mercy opposed to justice; it is simply what goodness does in the presence of need. By choosing this metaphor, Christ precludes the Augustinian justification of non-aid.
6. Power, Responsibility, and the Cross
In Christ, power generates responsibility rather than exemption. Christ heals because He can; He forgives because He can; He bears suffering because He can. Most decisively, on the cross, God absorbs the cost of restoration rather than refusing aid to preserve justice or sovereignty.
If God in Christ willingly enters the deepest privation to restore enemies, it becomes incoherent to claim that the same God eternally refuses to heal corruption where healing remains possible. The cross reveals divine love as self-giving, not selectively withholding.
7. Ethical Imitation and the Problem of Inimitable Goodness
Scripture repeatedly calls believers to imitate God and Christ. Yet under the Augustinian–Calvinist scheme, humans are commanded to love enemies, heal the broken, and refuse abandonment, while God is said to do precisely the opposite at the ultimate level. This renders divine goodness ethically inimitable and fractures the unity between divine command and divine action.
A goodness that cannot be mirrored is not exemplary; a love that withholds healing when healing is possible is not Christlike.
8. Conclusion
This essay has argued that the Augustinian–Calvinist account of divine goodness and love fails on three fronts. Metaphysically, it is inconsistent with the doctrine of evil as privation. Morally, it permits the unnecessary perpetuation of corruption by a perfectly good being. Christologically, it conflicts with the self-giving, restorative love revealed in Jesus Christ.
If evil is lack, goodness must heal.
If love is revealed in Christ, it must be restorative and non-withholding.
Selective non-redemption cannot be squared with either. The problem is not that Augustine and Calvin take divine holiness too seriously, but that they take Christ’s moral revelation insufficiently seriously. Christian theology, if it is to remain faithful to its centre, must allow Christ—not abstract attributes—to define the meaning of divine goodness and love.
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